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The Importance of Information and Participation 
Principles in Environmental Law in Brazil, 
the United States and Beyond 
David N. Cassuto and R6mulo S.R. Sampaio 
This article explores the two different kinds of uncer-
tainty, 'hard' uncertainty (unknown unknowns) and 
'soft' uncertainty (known unknowns), in the context of 
environmental law decision making. First, it is argued 
that these different categories should not be treated the 
same when facing decisions under uncertainty. To 
deal with these different uncertainties, a tiered risk 
analysis process is called for, wherein participatory 
techniques are used both to turn hard uncertainty into 
(more manageable) soft uncertainty as well as to 
increase the legitimacy of environmental decision 
making, even in cases of hard uncertainty. This meth-
odology can and should apply to all instances of 
domestic, transnational and international environ-
mental law making. This article applies this concep-
tual platform to analyze how participatory techniques 
can befactored in to manage uncertainty by reference 
to two domestic systems - American and Brazilian 
environmental law - as well as to international (envi-
ronmental) law. The article concludes that managing 
uncertainty in the environmental decision-making 
process is a procedural justice tool to promote more 
balanced and equitable outcomes. 
INTRODUCTION 
This article argues that participation is a key consider-
ation in managing uncertainty in environmental policy 
making. The main point is that participation - under-
stood as access to environmental information, partici-
pation in environmental decision making and access to 
justice - should be an important component of regula-
tory policies based on precaution. Indeed, whether con-
sidered as a principle or as an approach, the essence 
of precaution is to deal with uncertainty. We divide 
uncertainty into two distinct stages: 'hard' (unknown 
unknowns) and 'soft' (known unknowns or 'risks') 
uncertainty.' The term 'hard uncertainty' refers to cases 
where the triggering event may be known but the prob-
abilities of possible outcomes or even the outcomes 
themselves cannot be predicted. The term 'soft uncer-
1 D.N. Cassuto and R.S.R. Sampaio, 'Keeping it Legal: Transbound-
ary Management Challenges Facing Brazil and the Guarani', 36:5 
Water International (2011), 661. 
tainty' refers to circumstances where potentially nega-
tive outcomes and their probabilities can be predicted 
and, therefore, measured. In such cases, risks can be 
assessed. Consequently, soft uncertainty scenarios are 
subject to cost -benefit analysis and can be addressed 
through more rational and efficient policy-making pro-
cesses, whereas instances of hard uncertainty cannot. 
The impact of participation, in this context, is twofold. 
First, participation is useful for gathering and dissemi-
nating information on a given issue (for purposes of risk 
analysis, including 'risk assessment', 'risk management' 
and 'risk communication'), which, in turn, can help 
to move from 'hard uncertainty' to 'soft uncertainty'. 
Second, even when hard uncertainty cannot be dissi-
pated, participation remains an important procedural 
justice tool to make decisions taken under uncertainty 
more legitimate. Thus, participation is an important 
component of the development and implementation of 
environmental policies. Let us discuss this argument in 
more detail. 
The prevalence of uncertainty renders environmental 
decision making - already a multifaceted and intricate 
endeavour - even more complex. Uncertainty involves 
both scientific and socioeconomic dimensions. From a 
scientific perspective, environmental policy making 
aims to rely on the best available information and the 
best available technology - both of which vary widely 
depending on region and circumstances. However, the 
complexity of environmental decision making also 
stems from the need to account for different social and 
economic policies, interests and needs. These, too, vary 
significantly across regions, countries and continents, 
and are conditioned upon constitutions, treaties and 
statutes that establish various priorities and levels of 
risk aversion. It also bears emphasizing that risk assess-
ment is inherently subjective and region-specific. Policy 
decisions that have an impact on the environment can 
never equally benefit all affected groups. They involve 
tradeoffs or, in other words, they necessarily generate 
social costs that must be allocated somewhere. Differ-
ent groups and regions absorb different impacts; out-
comes preferable to some will be anathema to others. 
Environmental policy thus must accommodate human 
choices that vary across communities and societies even 
as it seeks to minimize global risk. Those two goals can 
© 2013 Blad<well Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 
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sometimes be at variance. For example, while some 
nations might be willing to accept the risks of geneti-
cally modified organisms (GMOs) in light of the boost it 
will provide to fbeir agricultural sectors, ofbers reject 
such risks because fbey believe fbat the potential 
dangers of GMOs outweigh any potential gains.' 
Because of the many diverse views and perceptions 
receiving input from many different variables, risk 
communication - understood as fbe interactive 
exchange of information from different stakeholders 
before a risky decision' - is a crucial instrument in any 
regulatory attempt to transition from hard to soft 
uncertainty. 
In order to assess fbe environmental and social costs 
(and concomitant sustainability) of a particular policy, 
fbe uncertainty it generates must be identified and 
measured as accurately as possible. Environmental law 
provides a variety of tools to do fbis, such as environ-
mental impact assessments, regular monitoring, train-
ing and capacity building and, last but not least, 
participation. These tools stem from an array of inter-
national declarations, conventions and treaties, as well 
as from domestic constitutions, statutes, regulations, 
and regional and local policies. Their primary objective 
is to reduce 'asymmetric information' (i.e., to ensure 
fbat relevant information is evenly diffused among 
different stakeholders, thus serving as an active and 
effective 'risk communication' strategy), and fbereby 
facilitate rational and efficient policy making. 
However, equal access to relevant information does not 
mean equal allocation of risk. Risk management does 
not necessarily facilitate equitable outcomes; rather it 
enables procedural fairness. Procedural fairness, in 
turn, is useful bofb in influencing decisions on fbe allo-
cation of costs and benefits (risk management) and in 
facilitating equitable outcomes (risk communication), 
even when facing 'hard uncertainty'. Environmental 
choices that acknowledge and allow for risks and fbat 
weigh the impact of negative externalities may be 
described as 'sustainable development'.4 
2 K. Anderson and L.A. Jackson, 'Why are US and EU Policies toward 
GMOs so Different?', 6:3 AgBioForum (2003), 95. 
3 R. O'Rourke, 'EU Measures on the Safety of Food Imports from 
Japan Following the Nuclear Accident at Fukushima', 3:1 European 
Journal of Risk Regulation (2012), 81, referring to European Com-
mission Regulation 178/2002 which defines risk communication as: 
'[T]he interactive exchange of information and opinions throughout 
the risk analysis process as regards hazards and risks, risk-related 
factors and risk perceptions, among risk assessors, risk managers, 
consumers, feed and food businesses, the academic community and 
other interested parties, including the explanation of risk assessment 
findings and the basis of risk management findings.' Regulation 1781 
2002 of 28 January 2002 Laying Down the General Principles and 
Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety 
Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety, 
[2002[ OJ L31/1, Arlicle 3.13. 
4 This definition differs from the widely accepted version, which 
defines 'sustainable development' as: '[A] process of change in which 
the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orien-
© 2013 Blackwell PltJlishing Ltd 
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Complex policy decisions involving development aspi-
rations, social needs and environmental objectives are 
made amidst a conflicting set of asserted rights. For 
example, fbe rights to development, a better quality of 
life, and fbe preservation and conservation of ecosys-
tems are often at loggerheads.' However, when affected 
parties are well informed and fbe degree of asymmetric 
information is low, risks are better managed and out-
comes gain legitimacy. Even when a decision disfavours 
some individuals, fbe chance to participate in fbe 
decision-making process increases fbe opportunities 
to influence fbe design of the policy. This leads to 
a more legitimate and just outcome. Opportunities 
for participation encompass more than formal legal 
requirements. They serve also as risk analysis tools 
encompassing fbe three prongs of risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication in contexts 
where outcomes cannot be predicted wifb precision.6 
In what follows, we explore the implications of partici-
pation as a tool to deal wifb uncertainty in environ-
mental policy making. Uncertainty is an inherent 
component of environmental regulation. Its effects on 
fbe policy-making process are significant. In some 
cases, a genuine environmental problem is denied 
or insufficiently tackled to the detriment of affected 
parties and fbe natural environment. In ofber cases, 
uncertainty adversely affects fbe efficiency and ratio-
nality of fbe process, particularly where unknown 
unknowns are over-emphasized and 'crowd out' areas 
where sufficient information is actually available and 
where proper risk analysis could take place. In fbis 
article, we argue for a tiered risk analysis process 
wherein participatory techniques are used both to turn 
hard uncertainty into (more manageable) soft uncer-
tainty as well as to increase fbe legitimacy of environ-
mental decision making, even in cases of hard 
uncertainty. This methodology can and should apply to 
all instances of domestic, transnational and interna-
tional environmental law making. 
To illustrate the proposed approach, we look at some 
examples derived from Brazilian and United States law. 
The selection of fbese two countries is based bofb on fbe 
aufbors' familiarity wifb them and on fbeir contrasting 
approaches to environmental decision making. We first 
provide an overview of fbe role of uncertainty in envi-
tation of technological development; and institutional change are all in 
harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet 
human needs and aspirations.' Our Common Future, Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common 
Future (UN Doc. Al42/427, 4 August 1987), Annex, at 54. However, 
we believe that our version is more accurate and descriptive and in no 
way contradicts the general understanding of the term. 
5 R. De Giorgi, Direito, Democracia e Risco: Vinculos Com 0 Futuro 
(Safe, 1998), aI191-192. 
6 See R. O'Rourke, n. 3 above, at 81 ('[R]isk communication within 
the risk analysis structure often plays second fiddle to risk assess-
ments and risk management decisions'). 
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rOnIllentallaw making. We discuss the role of hard and 
soft uncertainty in the risk analysis process and what it 
portends for public policy7 1his conceptual platform is 
then used to analyze how participatory techniques can 
be factored in to manage uncertainty by reference to 
two dOlnestie systems - Alnerican and Brazilian hn'{ -
as well as lo inlernalional (environmenlal) law. 
RISK AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Environmental law imposes regulatory demands that 
create opportunilies through restraint. As already 
noted, the nature of 'hard uncertainty' requires policy 
makers to ad: in the face of unknmm unknowns (i.e., 
when the probability of the oUlcomes, or even the oul-
comes themselves, are not known). 111is would render 
rational and efficient policy making particularly chal-
lenging. It is, however, in this context that resorling to 
palticipatory techniques may help to reduce the level of 
uncertainty. Diffusing information among stakeholders 
(Le., reducing the asymmetlY of informalion) would 
enhance the level of awareness ofthe local stakeholders 
with respect to a given problem. As they learn or 
become more acutely aware, these stakeholders may be 
led to share specific information that they may have on 
the issue at hand and, thereby, contribute to the man-
agement of the problem. The key is to prompt the 
sharing of such information and, as a regulator) to be 
capable of taking it into account. Thus, making loc~l 
stakeholders aware of a problem may be a useful step 
towards reducing the scientific unceltainty surround-
ing the problem. Even in those c~ses where local knowl-
edge has limited impact on the scientific understanding 
of the problem, it is, in all events, imporlanl in connec-
tion \vith the llmnagelnent of the socioeconomic impli-
cations (risk management) and "ith the legitimacy of 
regulatory action. 
In the light of these observations, one can more easily 
understand why participation is an important compo-
nent of precaution. Precaution is about decision making 
in a context of uncertainty.s If participation can guide 
such a process, either by reducing uncertainty (its scien-
tific and/ or socioeconomic dimensions) or by legitimiz-
ing the allocation of yet unknown costs and benefits, 
lhen precaulion is also aboul participation. Signifi-
cantly, precaution must not be equated with risk aver-
sion. Rather, precaution would mean the ability to 
handle unceltainty better and more confidenUy.' 11,e 
T B.M.J. van der Meulen et aI., 'Structural Precaution: The Application 
of Premarket Approval Schemes in EU Food Legislation', 67:4 Food 
and Drug Law Jouma! (2012), 453. at 454 (asserting that '[r]isk 
analysis is a science-based methodology consisting of risk assess-
ment, risk communication and risk management'). 
'~J.S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle', 27:1 
William and Maw Environmental Law and Policy Reviel,1I (2002), 13. 
9 There are instances where risk cannot be quantified and the pre-
cautionary approach does not function effectively. In these instances. 
@ ?013 Rlackwell Publistlino I td 
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dissemination of information entailed by this precau-
tionary approach c~n, as a maUer of fact, lead to greater 
tolerance of risk. As uncertainty is dissipated U,rough 
the reduction of asymmetric information and the risks 
are better understood, the latter may also be better tol-
erated on the basis of a more complete and shared 
understanding of costs and benefits. By contrast, secre-
tive treatment of information may lead to heightened 
fear and intransigence, deter innovation and even 
amplify potential harms.'" As discussed below, however, 
the precautionary approach can also be (mis)applied in 
ways that impede tlexibility and heighten risk. Thus, 
depending on its application, the precautionary 
approach ean translate into 1110re or less risk aversion. 
The degree of risk tolerance may be expressed in terms 
of the ratio of soft to hard unceltainty. When soft uncer-
tainties (known unknowns) predominate, cosl-benefit 
analyses gain coherence and risk analysis becomes a 
tool for mitigating harm and alleviating concern. 
Although uncertainty remains, the probability of pot en-
tially negative outcomes is measurable. On the other 
hand, in hard uncertainty scenarios, policy makers 
cannot know what they ignore and must act ,,~thout 
virtually any guidan(x, other than social perceptions. In 
turn, this situation may result in a feedback loop that 
diverts resources away fi'om risk analysis and toward 
rearguard measures aime:d at safeguarding the stahlS 
quo. In other words) precaution becomes severe risk 
aversion. Inslead of examining the implications of a 
situation, stakeholders tlY and think of comparable 
examples. If an example comes readily, it ,,111 form the 
basis for the social response even if statistically rare. 
Thus, for instance, enonnous resources are devoted to 
passenger inspections at airports although the risk of 
terrorist infiltration is low and likely not substantially 
affected by such measures. Meanwhile, little attenlion 
or money goes toward securing luarithne ports, where 
security is low and the comparative threat level much 
higher. It is fear and not reason that guides action. This 
tendency to focns on sources oflow risk but heightened 
fear leads to what Kuran and Sunstein call an 'availabil-
ity c..ascade', wherein the ensuing abundanc£ of infor-
mation about the perceived risk makes it increasingly 
difficult to obtain information about oU,er, more 
serious threats." Those who doubt the perceived risk 
scholars such as Daniel Farber have recommended the 
'a-precautionary principle', which considers 'both the worst case and 
best case scenarios, rather than focusing merely on uncertainty and 
harmful outcomes'. D.A Farber, 'Uncertainty', 99:4 Georgetown Law 
Joumai (2011), 901, at 905. 
h'See generally C.R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law and 
t!1e Envimnment (Cambridge University Press. 2004). 
111. Kuran and C.R. Sunstein, 'Availability Cascades and Risk Regu-
lation', 51:4 Stanford Law Review (1999), 683. Gillette and Krier 
present a contrasting vision of the lay public's conception of risk, 
arguing that for lay people, the model of risk is much richer because 
they are concerned with risks that 'have catastrophic potential, that 
are unfamiliar, uncontrollable, or involuntary, that threaten future 
generations that are distinctively threatening as opposed to 
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begin dou bting theillselves, thereby silencing an iInpor-
tant constituency whose opinions might lead to more 
rational behaviour." The result of these linked phe-
nomena is 'probability neglect' wherein powerful fed-
ings of fear lead people to ignore probability and focus 
instead on the worst case, irrespective of the greater 
danger from other causes.13 For eXaluple, ,\ve fear the 
highly improbable plane crash more than the much 
more likely possibility of a car accident. Probability 
neglect diverts resources away from the most serious 
d angers and concentrates them instead on palliating 
social unease.14 The result is inereased hard uneer-
lainly, genera led by inefficient investment of resources 
that could better be used to tackle existing soft uncer-
tainty. This, in turn, feeds into greater probability 
neglect. This bowdlerized precautionary approach 
underlies much societal dysfunction and Inislnanage:-
ment of resources. Much of the problem relies on the 
lilUe allenlion paid by policy makers lo risk communi-
cation strategies. That is due in part to the fad that 
regulators, in general, 'are poor cOlnmunieators'.i5 
Not all approaches to hard uncertainty are irrational, 
however. Postponing projects or regulatory action until 
widespread and shared by the general population, that are manmade 
as opposed to natural'. C.P. Gillette and J.E. Krier, 'Risk, Courts and 
Agencies', 138:4 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1990), 
1027, at 1073. By this logic, the lay conception of risk is far more 
complex and reflective of human nature. People tend to most fear 
those risks that arise from human behaviour and yet lie beyond their 
control. This presents a paradox wherein the actions of the govern-
ment to regulate behaviour and thereby control risk actually create 
the types of risk that the public most fears. See also D.rv1. Kahan, 
'Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation', 156:3 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (2008),741, at 743, which argues that 
emotional response to risk is a necessary and beneficial part of risk 
assessment and that attempting to 'shield law from the distorting 
influence of emotion' is a serious policy error arising from a serious 
error of perception. Kahan maintains that risk assessment is, or 
should be, a values-driven enterprise and that omitting it from the 
calculus ignores a key component of human reasoning and the 
human condition. 
I:' See C.R. Sunstein, n. 10 above, at 33-35,93-98. 
13 Ibid., at x-xi. 
1~ Ibid., at 51. 
15 R.E. Lofstedt, 'Risk versus Hazard: How to Regulate in the 2F 
Century', 2:2 European Journal of Risk Regulation (2011), 149, at 
153, which notes that: '[A]part from anything else, [regulators] are 
often too slow to communicate, because in many cases held back by 
the vast bureaucratic machinery that makes up most government 
departments. By being slow in their communication strategies officials 
spend more time firefighting and engaging in reactive communica-
tions. The problem with this strategy is that reactive risk communica-
tion destroys public trust whereas proactive risk communication gains 
public trust. This is complicated by the fact that many regulatory 
bodies do not understand the importance of risk perception and staff 
has not been trained in risk communication. They therefore often find 
it difficult to convey clear and concise messages needed for the 
modern media. To address this problem, regulators could either be 
encouraged to participate in existing continuing education risk com-
munication courses for professionals such as those developed by 
Harvard University, or by developing customised risk-communication 
and risk-analysis guidelines, something that the EFSA is presently 
doing.' 
@ /01:'1 Rlackwell PublisFlinn ltd 
information can be gathered and analyzed is in itself a 
form of cost -benefit analysis. It posits that the benefits 
of immediate action or regulation arc outweighed by 
those gained through information gathering. The delays 
created by such decisions C<ln involve significant social 
costs. Indeed, critics of precaution point to the inertia 
thal arises from unchecked informalion galhering as 
e,idence of the unsoundness of the precautionary 
approach and its sus<x'ptibility to misuse both by the 
overly fearful and by those who intentionally fear-
monger.16 In such eircumstanc("s, an abundance of 
caution - even in the absence of an availability cascade 
- can lead lo decisions that defy sound management 
strategies and foster ignorance.17 
Choosing one strategy or another (precaution as man-
agement versus precaution as fear) presupposes some 
level of participation. But the role of participation in the 
two cases is different. In the context of precaution as 
management, participation intervenes in connection 
'ivith risk assessment, risk management and risk com-
munication, 'ivhereas in the context of precaution as 
fear, participation may in fact crowd out risk analysis 
and, at best, contribute an additional measure oflegiti-
macy to the measures taken (or the lack thereof). 
Hmvever) Ule boundaries bet\veen the two conte..xts are 
sometimes blurred. Ibrough analyzing examples taken 
fr0111 the Brazilian and Al11erican domestic systems) we 
endeavour to shed light on how to calibrate participa-
tion as a tool to manage uncertainty. 
PARTICIPATION AS AN 
UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT 
TOOL: DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
AB noted in the introduction, this section illustrates 
the foregoing considerations by referencc to the Bra-
zilian and American legal systems. Broadly speaking, 
the latter is unjustifiably confident in the face of 
uncertainty, whereas the former tends to be over-
eaulious. vVhile this generalizalion is overly broad 
and not universally accurate, it is neveltheless useful 
as it highlights the differen(x>s in the historieal 
development of American and Brazilian environmen-
tal law. 
~6 N. Oreskes and E.M. Conway, 'Challenging Knowledge: How 
Climate Science Became a Victim of the Cold War", in: R.N. Proctor 
and L. Schiebinger (eds.), Agnot%gy: The ivfaking and Unmaking of 
Ignorance (Stanford University Press, 2008), 78 (discussing what 
Hofstadter termed the 'paranoid style' in American politics). 
'7 This is particularly true for what Farber terms 'fat tail risks'. See 
D.A. Farber, n. 9 above, at 956. See generally C.R. Sunstein, n. 10 
above. 
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Historically, the American system has employed a reac-
tive approach, operaling on the assumption that risk 
can be successfully identified and quantified. This 
approach displays a high degree of confidence in con-
ventional risk analysis and a willingness to ignore 
unquantifiable uncertainty. By contrast, Brazilian envi-
ronmentallaw, which developed at the same lime as the 
nation developed, evolved to face different challenges. 
These differences underpin the divergent approaches to 
11l1cRrtainty and participation taken by each system. 
INFORM A TlON AND 
PARTICIPA TlON IN US LA W 
Environmental law in the United States looked to miti-
gate a lack of proper environmental risk analysis in the 
past. Unlike Brazil, whose environmental legal regime 
emerged as part of the nation's rapid development, the 
United States was already industrialized and its popu-
lation's basic needs already met when emironmental 
laws CaIne to the fore. 
As noted above, most emironmentallaws in the United 
States do not acknowledge unknowable risks. For 
example, although U,e National Environmenlal Policy 
Act ('US NEPA')" calls for potential harms stemming 
from agency actions to be assessed and discloscd/9 and 
although the threat ofterrorism for nuclear facilities is 
both obvious and potentially catastrophic, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission does not acknowledge the 
lhreat of lerrorism in ils Environmenlal Impact State-
ments because such risks cannot be quantified." 
Similarly, agencies also need not discuss worst case sce-
narios in their Environmental Impact Statements. 
Instead, they must disclose potential information defi-
cits that are relevant to 'reasonably foreseeable signifi-
cant adverse hnpaets'.21 Perhaps an even starker 
example is Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO 
v. American Pelmleum Institute (Benzene Case), in 
which the Supreme Court held that an agency could not 
regulate a known c<1rcinogen unless it could conchl-
sively show through p~"isting data that the health risk 
surpassed a quantifiable level." 
Despite these limitations, the US NEPA has a strong 
pmticipatory component. The first law of its kind in 
the world, it not only introduced the importance of 
w 42 USC §§4321-4347 (2012). 
19 Ibid., at §4332. 
F! The Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning in San Luis Obispo 
Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regufato!y Comm'n, 449 F.3d 1016. 
1032 (9th Cir. 2006). However. the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
has refused to change its policy. See DA Farber, n. 9 above. at 
909-910. 
21 See D.A. Farber, n. 9 above, at 916 (citing 40 CFR §1502.22 
(2009)). 
n Indus. Union Dept AFL-CiO v. APi, 448 US 607. 614-615 (1980) 
(plurality opinion). 
@ ?013 Rlackwell Publistlino I td 
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exanllmng potential environmental impacts of pro-
posed governmental activities, but also the ideas of 
public participation and investigation of alternative 
courses of action that could prevent or mitigate nega-
tive impacts before they occurred. In addition to man-
dating the use of Environmental Impact Statements, it 
was also the firsl environmental law to explicitly incor-
porate the direct involvement of non-elected citizens 
into the decision-making process. It infused anticipa-
tory and precautionary planning into the earliest stages 
of project development. The power of the information 
thereby gleaned to galvanize public participation and 
influence policy making has proven quile formidable.'" 
Despite this predisposition loward data-driven risk 
assessment, the precautionary approach is not entirely 
absent Ji'om American environmental law. Courts have 
consistently held that the Clean Air Act (CAAY' 
requires the Environmental Protection Age11(Y (EPA) to 
regulate pollutants even in the face of uncertainty as to 
their potenlial harm. In Elhyl Corp. v. Environmental 
i'rotectionAgency, the petitioner challenged the EPA's 
decision to regulate lead emissions Ji'Olllmotor vehicles 
in the absence of hard proof that they posed a threat. 
The court rejected this challenge, noting that 'awaiting 
certainty will often allow for only reactive, not preven-
tative regulation' ," and that 'where existing methodol-
ogy or research in a ne\v area of regulation is deficienl) 
the agency necessarily enjoys broad discretion to for-
mulate solutions on the basis of available informa-
tion'.'" This deference to a precautionary approach to 
air quality was confirmed in su bsequent cases. In 
Whitman v. American Trucking Association,"! the 
Supreme Courl confirmed lhallhe language of the CAA. 
gives the EPA administrator broad discretion to safe-
guard public health. The law instructs the EPA to set air 
quality standards 'the attainment and maintenance of 
which ... are requisite to proted: the public health'. 'S It 
further states that such standards must incorporate 'an 
adequale margin of safety'." The respondenl chal-
lenged the EPA's methodology, arguing that cost COI1-
cerns should play a role in the setting of emission 
standards. The court rejected this argument, holding 
that the clear langu age of the statute requires the 
administrator to focus solely on protecting the public 
from hazardous eInissions. The statute's directive) 
including building in an 'adequale margin of safety' was 
found to be an intelligible principle through which to 
23 D.N. Cassuto and J.A. Edgar, 'The Basics of NEPA and Its Role in 
Combating Climate Change', in: R. Sampaio, G. Leal and A. Reis 
(eds.), Topicos de Direito Ambienta/: 30 Anos da Po/rtica do ivfeio 
Ambiente (Editora Lumen Press, 2012), 629. 
"42 USC §§7401-7671 q (2012). 
"Ethyl Corp. v. EPA. 541 F.2d 1 (DG Cir. 1976), at 25. 
26 Ibid., at 27, n. 18. 
Whitman v. Am. Tfllci<ing Ass'n. 531 US 457 (2001). 
"42 USC §7409(b)(I) (2012). 
" Ibid. 
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guide the agency)s rule making.30 Consequently, the 
EPA must incorporate a degree of caution into its emis-
sion stand ards. Ihis type of precautionary approach is 
to SOl118 exte:l1t presf':nt in other stahltes as \veIlY 
Public participation can serve as either a boon or 
impediment to the process of managing uncertainly in 
the United States. For example, in the recent contro-
versy over ground-level ozone regulation, public outcry 
(and cilizenlawsuits) brought the Bush-era ozone stan-
dards under public scrutiny for failing to incorporate 
lhe lalest scienlific knowledge. Vvl,en President Obama 
took office in ,JanualY 2009, his EPA administrator 
declared the regulations 'not legally defensible' under 
the CAAY The Administration then persuaded the 
plaintiffs to suspend their lawsuits pending the EPA's 
issuance of new regulations. The next several years SR'i,'{ 
unremilting pressure bolh from cilizens' groups and 
from industry. The citizen groups demanded the stan-
dards be strengthened due to increasing evidence 
of public health threats posed by ozone. Regulatory 
groups, on the other hand, argued that stricter stan-
dards were unnecessary in the face of the uncertain 
nature of the public health threats and that increased 
regulation would undermine the economy_ In Septem-
ber 2011, President Obama rejected the advice of his 
EPA and kept the Bush-era standards in place, arguing 
that his action would decrease regulatory uncertainty.33 
The outcry was immediate and vociferous and the 
litigation continues. 
Ironically, public pressure brought the issue of ozone 
regulation into focus but also created years of uncer-
tainty and litigation as two presidential administra-
tions sought to address both public health and 
induslry pressures. TI,e CAA. requires fhe Administra-
tion to issue new standards in 201:3.34 It reluains to be 
seen how the newly re-elected President will attempt 
to meet his statutory obligations while also negotiating 
the seemingly conflicting goals of protecting public 
health and satisfying industry's demand for regulatory 
predictabilily. 
In sum, environmental law in the United States lacko; a 
clear, defining principle with respect to risk analysis. It 
tends toward a data-driven, reactive approach but also 
::'0 Vllhitman, n. 27 above, at 474. 
:31 The 1996 Food Quality Protection Act. for example. requires that 
for food to which infants and children are exposed, the EPA must set 
pesticide levels at ten times the established margin of safety. See 
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 7 USC § 136. See also the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 7 USC§136ff 
and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC §2601ff. 
v Letter from Administrator Lisa Jackson (13 July 2011), found at: 
<http://www.eenews.netiassets/2011/07/14idocument_Qw_ 03. pdf>. 
33 White House, Statement by the President on the Ozone National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (2 September 2011), found at: <httpJ! 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-officei2 0 11 i09 1021 state men t-
pr esi de nt -ozon e-n ati on al-amb ie nt -ai r -qual i ty-standards > . 
0~ Ibid. See also <http:lh.v\vw.epa.gov/glo/actions.html>. 
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incorporates the precautionary approach in various 
instances. Like the Brazilian system discussed below, 
the i\merican legal regime is constrained by an inability 
to adjust to information deficits. It also often utilizes a 
rigid risk assessment mechanism that is vulnerable to 
hard un(x,rtainty. That vulnerability stems in part from 
poor application of both the precaulionaty and data-
driven approaches and in part Ji'om weaknesses in the 
approaches themselves. While increased stakeholder 
patticipation, access to information and effective risk 
communication strategies will not resolve all these sys-
temic flaws, they would significantly decrease avoidable 
instances of hard uncertainty. For example, in lhe 
aforementioned controversy over ozone standards, 
public participation led to a re-examination of the sci-
entific viability of the Administration's proposed stan-
danls. Forcing the EPA to defend its position also 
brought considerable new informalion to light and led 
to increased scruliny of the agency's role as walchdog of 
environmental and public health threats. 
INFORMA TlON AND 
PARTICIPA TlON IN THE 
BRAZILIAN LEGAL REGIME 
Brazil presents an example: of an emerging economic 
power with an advanced environmental law regime that 
continues to face significant structural challenges. Like 
fhe Uniled Stales, Brazil is geographieallyvasl and eco-
10gic~lIy diverse. During the past two decades, Brazilian 
law makers have stmggled to decrease inequality by 
promoting development policies more evenly through-
out rich and poor areas of the countty. To date, this goal 
has been primarily accomplished tllrough policies such 
as the 'Bolsa Farnilid;15 as ,,,,ell as by incentivizing the 
agricultural and industrial sectors. During this SaIne 
period, Brazil also significantly revised its environmen-
tallaws and policies." 
Against fhis backdrop, one can more easily understand 
how diffenmt inten':sts, perspectives and even constihl-
tional rights can collide. On the one hand, Brazil has an 
enormous number of people who lack access to proper 
education, sanitation and other basic needs. On the 
other hand, groups of conservationists empowered by 
the country's modern environnH.mtal hn\'s are advocat-
ing strongly for a stricter interpretation and enforce-
ment of those laws. In this context, one may p~"pect 
participation to playa very important role in connec-
tion wilh fhe allomlion of tile cosls and benefils of 
:'.5 For a description of the Bolsa Familia programme, see 'How to Get 
Children Out of Jobs and Into School: The Limits of Brazil"s Much 
Admired and Emulated Anti-Poverty Programme', The Economist (29 
June 2010), found at: <http://www.economist.com/node/16690887>. 
36 P.A.L. Machado (ed.), Direito Ambienta! Brasifeiro (Malheiros, 
2011) (presenting a historical ovenriew of the Brazilian environmen-
tal. constitutional and regulatory history). 
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environmental (or, conversely, developmental) policies 
among different stakeholders as well as with the legiti-
mization of such choices. 
In theOlY, information and palticipation form a large 
part of the Brazilian env~ronmental legal regimeY 
Information and participation in environmental policy 
making is guaranteed by the 1988 Constitution. Access 
to information is guaranteed by Article 5 of the Consti-
tution, which lists all fundamental rights, ineluding the 
right to information)' TI,e Constitution also devotes a 
whole chapler to environmenlal rights. Article 225 
requires environmental impact assessments from all 
pr'!iects with the potential to impact the emironment.39 
It further requires the govcrnnH.mt to prOlllote environ-
mental education while mandating civil participation in 
environmental decision making. TI,e 1981 National 
Environmental Policy Act (Brazil NEPAl'o codifies 
lhese conslitutional guidelines. In Article 9, the Brazil 
NEPA lists the tools of environmental policy. Among 
them is the national environmental information 
system, which aggregates all relevant policy and 
project-related information wifh environmental rel-
evance4 ' In addition to fhe Constitution and the Brazil 
NEP A, tile Brazilian Congress enacted tile AceRss lo 
Environmental Information Act in 200:3, which guar-
antces public ac(x>ss to information and data from cnvi-
ronmental authorities and agencies.'" More recently, in 
2011, the: Free:dom of Information Lmv",vas enaded.43 
TIllS law) guaranteeing aec..ess to information retained 
by any public agency or authority, c,on be seen as the 
equivalent to the Freedom of Information Act in the 
United States. 
Following the Brazil NEPA, information and participa-
tion in fhe Brazilian legal framework divides into two 
difIerent and equally imporlanl stages: public policy, 
and project level. Within the list of available tools, the 
Brazil NEPA employs two structural and fundamental 
instruments of environmental policy: zoning and 
environmental quality standards. With regard to devel-
opment projects, the Brazil KEPA mandates environ-
3;' L. McAllister, Making Law Matter: Environmenta! Protection and 
Lega! institutions in Brazil (Stanford University Press, 2008), at 178-
185. 
38 Constituiy30 Federal de 1988, Article 5. (For an unofficial English 
version of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, see 'Brazil: 1988 Consti-
tution with 1 996 Reforms'. in Georgetown University Political Data-
base of the Americas (last updated November 2008), found at: 
<h Up: f /pd ba. george town. eduiConsti tuti on siBrazi II eng I i sh96 . htm I > . ) 
:.,,1 Ibid., Article 225. 
40 Lei No. 6,938, de 31 de agosto de 1981, found at: <http://www. 
planalto.gov.brfccivil_03/leisfL6938.htm>. Article 9. 
41 For the information principle under the Brazilian NEPA law, 
see RS.R. Sampaio, 'A Importancia dos Princlpios da Informayao e 
da Participayao em um Contexto de Decisao sob Incerteza', in: 
R Sampaio, G. Leal and A. Reis, n. 23 above, 443. 
~2Ibid .. at 443; Lei No. 10,650. de 16 de abril de 2003. found at: 
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil ___ 03/Leis/2003/L10.650.htm> . 
·,3 Lei No. 12,527, de 18 de Novembro de 2011, found at: <www. 
planalto.gov.brfccivil_03/_at02011-2014f2011/IeifI12527.htm>. 
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mental impact statements and environmental permits. 
Information and parlicipation are embedded in all of 
these pradiees.+1 Hmvever, in reality, these tools are 
mere formalities and do not fulfil their objective. That is 
to say, they do not serve as li.mdamental instruments of 
procedural rights geared toward producing balanced 
resulls. In other words, Brazilian policy makers are 
failing to effectively implement one of the three core 
pillars of risk analysis: risk cOlnmunieationY; 
The Belo Monte Dam, a controversial dam project sited 
in the Amazon, oft'.,rs a useful example of how these 
tools get distorted in practice. Lack of strong, active and 
representalive civil organizations,46 coupled with too 
little space for pu blic pmticipation in strategic energy 
investment decisions at the federal level/' created a 
regulatory environment that favours big hydroelectric 
power plants, including Belo Monte:'; Once a policy is 
adopled, changing or lailoring il a l the projecl level 
becomes impossible despite the statutory opportunities 
44 Lei No. 6.938, de 31 de Agosto de 1981, found at: <http://www. 
pi anal to. gov. br iccivi 1 ___ 03 ILei si L69 38. h tm> . 
45 M.G. Puder, 'The Rise of Regional Integration Law (RIL): Good 
News to International Environmental Law (IEL)?', 23:2 Georgetown 
international Environmentai Law Review (2012),165, at 189: 'Tradi-
tional risk analysis comprises the triad of assessment, management, 
and communication. Risk assessment offers qualitative or quantita-
tive risk estimation in light of data collected, documented, and evalu-
ated in pursuance of scientific research and analysis. It moves from 
hazard identification and hazard characterization to exposure 
appraisal and risk characterization. Risk management then tackles 
the task of constraining and reducing risk to levels deemed accept-
able. In this stage, policy considerations enter the mix. Finally, 
risk communication disseminates findings and measures to the 
stakeholders.' 
4(> Comissao Mundial sobre Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento, 
Nosso Futuro Comum [Our Common Future] (FGV, 1988), at 46 
(noting the insufficient levels of civil society organization in develop-
ing countries). See also D. Hunter, J. Salzman and D. Zaelke, inter-
national Environmental Law and Policy (Foundation Press, 2002), at 
167. 
47 Ministerio Minas e Energia, Plano Decenal de Expansao de 
Energia 2020 (2011), found at: <http://www.mme.gov.br/mme/ 
galeriasiarquivos/noticias/2011 /SUMARIO-PDE2020.pdf>. The intro-
ductory note signed by the Minister of Mines and Energy thanks civil 
society and all interested groups who participated in public hearings 
concerning the plan, but the plan itself does not describe how par-
ticipation helped and in which way comments were addressed and 
incorporated into the final version presented to the public. Being such 
an important requirement. information and participation should have 
received a much more thorough treatment by the Brazilian Energy 
Plan, describing selection process, disclosure of information, detail-
ing comments received and how they were addressed so that those 
tools can effectively work and reflect their role in such an important 
policy making process. 
,jR BBC News Latin American and Caribbean, 'Work to Resume 
on Brazil's Belo Monte Dam' (28 August 2012), found at: <http:// 
VIfININ.bbc.co .ukinews/world-latin-america-19404 740> (providing a 
summary and overview of the legal battles fought in Brazilian courts. 
including the Brazilian Supreme Court on different attempts from 
different stakeholder for information and participation in the decision-
making process concerning the Belo Monte Dam). 
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for public participation. :"Iultipie interests and agendas 
come into play and transform information and partici-
pation into purposeless rituals that lack any genuine 
utility. 
The dam project serves to illustrate the ongoing 
unwillingness to make effective use of the information 
arising from public participation. A more organized 
and participatory civil society is a prerequisite for 
more balanced and just projects. The challenge facing 
Brazilian interest groups is not a lack of opportunity to 
palticipate, but rather an entrenched unwillingness to 
honour the inpul arising from U,al parlicipalion. As a 
result, projects like Belo Monte proceed ,,~thout 
adequately addressing public concerns. Changing the 
culture of policy making to better utilize public par-
ticipation will allow for better and more qualified par-
ticipation at the project level. This shift could and 
should lead lo a more coherenl nalional em~ronmen­
tal polity that implements a virtuous circle of infor-
mation and participation. 
VVhat the Brazilian legal regime 'on the books' indicates 
and what praclice illustrates is that despite the sophis-
liealion of Imvs concerning access to informalion and 
the right to pmticipation, bridging the gap between 
theory and reality is still necessary. Public knowledge 
and participation are often restricted and, as a result, 
procedural justice and legitimacy become compro-
mised. Policy makers have yet to realize that informa-
tion and participation are more than just formal 
requirements in the law and must effectively include 
civil society in the decision-making process. The Cnited 
States example offers a different but equally cautionary 
tale. The statutory regime is highly reactive even as the 
opportunity for public participation is significant. If the 
statutes allowed for greater acknowledgement of the 
role of uncRrlainly in emironmental policy, the efficacy 
of public pmticipation would be significantly enhanced. 
As it is, hmvcvcr, reducing uncertainty remains an 
elusive goal - one that is often impeded by regulatory 
inflexibility. 
INFORMA TlON AND 
PARTICIPA TlON IN 
INTERNA TlONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Parlicipalion and informalion principles are as impor-
tant at fue intemationallevel as they are at the domestic 
level. C nccrtainty regarding the long-term effects of 
global environmental issues has allowed producers and 
consumers of products with potential negative effects to 
argue against taking corrective action until more infor-
malion is known.'19 This has permilled multinational 
Z.A. Smith, The Environmentai Policy Paradox: International Envi-
ronmenta/ Management, 511-, edn (Pearson, 2008), at 275-292. 
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corporations to maximize profits by basing their busi-
ness operations in locations with the least stringent 
environnH.mtal Imvs.50 Participation principles at the 
international level have beeomf,: inereasingly urgent 
bec<luse of the lack of intergovernmental cooperation 
to iInprove international enVir01llnental standards.51 
As noted in the introductory article lo this issue 
of RECIEL, participatory techniques could provide a 
means of (outsourcing' the pressure required for States 
and companies to implement interna lional environ-
mentallaw.c,2 
Environmental participation was first introduced in 
Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration'" and thereaf-
ter becmne \\'i.dcsprcad in international environmental 
instmments.54 Many mullilateral environmental agree-
ments follomng the Rio Declaration incorporated 
similar participation principles." The 19% UNECE 
Guidelines on Access to Environmenlal Deeision-
making classified public participation as 'one of the 
seven key clements for the long-term environmental 
program for Europel •56 These international mecha-
nisms laid the frame:,work for the main instnlmf:':nt on 
environmental participation - the Aarhus Conven-
tion/,,7 which propounded access to environmental 
infonnation) publk participation in decision making 
and environmental matters, and access to justice in 
environmental matters.'" The public participation pro-
visions have allmved citizens to aec(:ss (an international 
venue where national options have been exhausted'.59 
5J Ibid. 
C1 M. Dellinger. 'Ten Years of the Aarhus Convention: How Proce-
dural Democracy is Paving the Way for Substantive Change in 
National and International Law', 23:2 Colorado Joumal of Interna-
tional Environmental Law and Policy (2012), 309, at 315. 
5~ See the contribution by Vifiuales in this issue. 
,,3 Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration states: 'Environmental issues 
are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the 
relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appro-
priate access to information concerning the environment that is held 
by public authorities. including information on hazardous materials 
and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate 
in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage 
public awareness and participation by making information widely 
available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, 
including redress and remedy, shall be provided. Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development. found in Report of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development. (UN Doc. 
AlCONF,151!26 (Vol, I), 12 June 1992), at 10.' 
b~ See M. Dellinger, n. 51 above. 
5:· Ibid., at 318 (citing the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, and the Protocol on Water 
and Health to the Convention on the Protection and Use of the 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes). 
~G Ibid. at 319. 
5i United Nations Economic Committee for Europe·s (UNECE) Con-
vention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 
Denmark, 25 June 1998; in force 8 October, 2009). 
')3 <http://www.unece.org/envipp/contentofaarhus.html> . 
C9 See M. Dellinger, n. 51 above, at 365. 
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Additionally, the Aarhus Convention and other similar 
international agreements demonstrate a gro ...... rJ.ng 
awareness among countries that effectiveness of envi-
ronmental principles at the international level must 
hnprove. 
\lVhile international agreements are iInpOltant, they 
only reach the countries bound by them. Furthermore, 
they are only as strong as the most reluctant pmtici-
pant's threshold. International agreements also suffer 
h'Olll a dearth of specific guidelines for providing access 
to information and enabling public participation. The 
Aarhus Convention demonstrates how multilateral 
enVir0111nental agreements ean efficiently foster proce-
dural rights such as the right to information, public 
participalion and aCAOess to justice. It also illustrates 
that conventions such as these are limited to those 
countries that choose to be bound by them. As Vifiuales 
and Chuffarl nole, the Aarhus Convention 'requires 
State parties to introduce into their domestic legislation 
three clusters of environmental procedural rights' (>0 
Those rights are: information, public participation and 
access to justice. Implementation often depends on the 
enforcement mechanism set up by the Convention 
under the coordination of a Compliance Committee." 
The Aarhus Convention illustrates how effective multi-
lateral environmental agreements can be in the promo-
tion of procedural rights while also showing how the 
scope of international law is often limited to developed 
societies "ith greater levels of domestic political stabil-
ity and a greater degree of civi.l society organization.6~~ 
By contrast, less developed countries face challenges in 
adhering to international environmental agreements. 
They often lack internal political stability and have 
development priorities that do not allow for social or 
environmental obstacles arising from information and 
public participalion mechanisms. Those faclors, in 
turn, have a negative iInpact on the effeetiveness of 
GO J.E. Vinuales and S. Chuffart, From t!1e Other S!wre: Economic, 
Socia! and Cultural Rights from an Intemationai Environmental Law 
Perspective (Graduate Institute Geneva, Centre for International 
Environmental Studies, 2011), at 13. 
61 Ibid., stating that: 'The Aarhus Convention is interesting for our 
analysis in a number of ways. First. the Convention obliges States to 
implement what could be broadly referred to as 'transparency mea-
sures' or 'environmental democracy' measures. Thus States must 
introduce into their domestic systems three clusters of environmental 
procedural rights that allow civil society to put pressure on States 
(and therefore, to some extent, to monitor them) in connection with 
environmental policies and environment-related activities. Second. 
where States fail to implement such measures, civil society groups 
can bring a complaint before a compliance committee specifically 
established by the Convention for this purpose.' 
G2 For a list of signatory countries of the Aarhus Convention, see 
United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on Access to Informa-
tion, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters, found at: <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src-TREATY &mtdsg __ no-XXVII-13&chapter-27 & 
lang.:::en>. 
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international law, particularly in the realm of proce-
dural rights. 
The RiO+20 summit exemplifies how an international 
coni,",rencc, which initially was expeded to propel these 
issues forward, fell short of providing any genuine guid-
ane.!':,: or solutions.6,,:\ As ]\forgera and Savaresi note) 
despite the fact that 'green economy' comprised one of 
the U,emes of U,e conference, the participanl countries 
failed to even agree on a definition of the term, mueh 
less a roadmap for its implementation. They did, 
however, emphasize the need for inelusiveness and par-
ticipation in the development of an evenhlal consensus 
understanding of the term."4 And that agreement, while 
modesl, embraces participation and informa lion 
sharing and, if effectively implemented, eould signifi-
cantly aid in future international negotialions. 
CONCLUSION 
Information and participation are instrumental to a 
coherent precautionary approach. If the goal is to trans-
mule hard uncertainly into sofluncerlainly and lhereby 
enable competent risk analysis (including risk assess-
Inent, risk management and risk eom111unieation), 
eliminating aSymmetric- information is enlC-iaL Infor-
mation gathering prior to adion or rnle making forms 
the essence of risk analysis and the embodiment of the 
precmrlionary principle. It enables just and equitable 
outeomes by reducing aSY11llnetrie information, allow-
ing for social accountability and providing procedural 
justice. It thus makes the decision-making process 
1110re legitimate. 
Information gathering and public parlicipalion are 
components of Brazilian and American national laws as 
well as, Inore generally, of international conventions. 
However, for a variety of reasons, such as national 
development agendas, domestic political instability, 
lack of binding international conventions promoting 
procedural rights for developing countries, and reactive 
legal systems to risks as opposed to prevention poliey 
mechanisms in the American case (e.g., the US NEPA 
nuclear lerrorism pJ{ample), participatory lechniques 
are not fully effective. This, in turn, impairs effective 
implementation of proactive risk communication 
strategies. In Brazil, information and participation are 
guaranteed by national law, but in practice they serve as 
mere formal requirements rather than effective compo-
nents of environmental decision making. In the Cnited 
States, they are also part of the legal framework, but 
83 F. Ullah, Rio+20: Dig Deep, Prepare to Act and Have Hope (Out-
reach, 2012), at 1. 
84 See the contribution by Morgera and Savaresi in this issue. 
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often in such a diluted form that uncertainty and risk 
are ignored in the policy-making process. 
In the international realm, information and palticipa-
lion are built into major multilateral emironmental 
agreements. However, the lack of multi-stakeholder 
parlicipalion in inlernalional decision making and the 
lack of progress in turning international procedural 
laws into national and locally accountable commit-
ments hamper the aforementioned benefits. 
In sunl, genuine precaution - an acknowledged COlll-
milmenl lo reducing hard uncertainty lhrough infor-
mation gafhering and public participation thereby 
leading to coherent and functional risk analysis - con-
tinues to be more of a grail than a genuine policy 
initiative. The unwillingness of fhe international C0111-
munity to commit to comprehensive risk analysis is 
parl of the reason why RiO+20 failed to generale any 
signific.ant international agreement. This is due in large 
part to the ongoing failure to adopt Ji.mctional risk 
analysis policies at the domestic level. The United 
States and Brazil offer useful examples of why such 
failures persist. Each nation has its own unique reasons 
for ineft("ctiveiy managing risk. The failure, however, is 
global in scope. 
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